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A TRANSLATION OF BOLZANO'S PAPER ON 
THE INTERMEDIATE VALUE THEOREM 
BY S. B. RUSS 
OPEN UNIVERSITY, GREAT BRITAIN 
SUMMARIES 
This is the first English translation of Bolzano's 
paper, Rein analytischer Beweis des Lehrsatzes, dass 
zwischen je zwey Werthen, die ein entgegengesetzes 
Resultat gewshren, wenigstens eine reelle Wurzel der 
Gleichung liege (Prague 1817). It has already appeared 
in French, Russian, and Czechoslovakian translations. 
The paper represents an important stage in the rigorous 
foundation of analysis and is one of the earliest occa- 
sions when the continuity of a function and the conver- 
gence of an infinite series are both defined and used 
correctly. 
Voici la premiere traduction en Anglais de l'gtude 
de Bolzano, Rein analytischer Beweis des Lehrsatzes, dass 
zwischen je zwey Werthen, die ein entgegengesetzes Res- 
ultat gewghren, wenigstens eine reelle Wurzel der Glei- 
chung liege. (Prague, 1817). Elle est dgj> parue en 
Francais, en Russe et en Tcheque. L'etude reprgsente 
une &ape importante de la rigoureuse fondation de 
l'analyse et constitue une des premikres occasions oii 
la continuitg d'une fonction et la convergence d'une 
sgrie infinie sont d&erminges aussi bien qu'employ&es 
correctement. 
INTRODUCTION 
Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) was Professor of Theology at the 
University of Prague from 1807 until his deposition in 1819 after 
a long dispute resulting from his relatively radical views on 
politics and theology. Mathematics and philosophy were his 
primary interests from an early age, although he studied and 
contributed throughout his life to other areas including ethics 
and logic. His major work, Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Science), 
published in 1837, is primarily a textbook of logic and has had 
large selections translated into English in recent years (see 
Bolzano 118371). 
For mathematicians, Bolzano is probably best known for the 
"Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem," which derives from the results 
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in the following paper. But the extent of his mathematical 
contributions and their originality and motivation are not 
generally well known. It is with a view to making at least his 
early mathematical work more widely available that the present 
translation is intended to be the first of a series of five. 
These are the mathematical works published by Bolzano between 
1804 and 1817, when there was a break in his output due partly 
to the censorship imposed on him from Vienna. These five works 
are listed at the end of this introduction. 
Although the present work [Bolzano 1817) was the last of the 
five to be written, its translation has been presented first for 
two reasons. It is the most mathematically significant, and it 
contains a substantial preface in which Bolzano describes the 
background and motivation not only of this work but also of most 
of the earlier ones. 
The main mathematical achievements of the paper include: 
(a) the formal definition of the continuity of a function of 
one real variable, correctly understood and applied (Preface); 
(b) the criterion for the (pointwise) convergence of an 
infinite series, although the proof of its sufficiency, prior to 
any definition or construction of the real numbers, is inevi- 
tably inadequate (Sect. 7); 
(c) the original form of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem 
(Sect. 12); 
(d) an analytic proof of the intermediate value theorem, 
now sometimes called Bolzano's theorem (Sect. 15). 
The theorem in the title of the paper, where "equation" is 
understood as "polynomial equation in one real variable," is 
deduced in the final paragraph (Sect. 18) from result (d). 
Bolzano was not the first to be dissatisfied with geometric 
proofs and to see the need for an analytic proof of the inter- 
mediate value theorem, but he was certainly foremost in develop- 
ing the concepts and methods to answer that need. In doing so 
he was responding directly and explicitly to his particular 
philosophical demands. These philosophical views and the mathe- 
matical and historical importance of the paper are considered 
in some detail in Russ [19801. It is for this reason that the 
Notes (referred to by numbers in square backets) are mainly 
confined to textual and bibliographic matters. 
Where specific reference has been made in the text to the 
earlier works, the relevant quotations or summaries have been 
given in the Notes. All footnotes are footnotes in the original. 
The present translation is based on Jourdain [19051, but 
with reference to the original editions of 1817 and 1818 and to 
the most recent edition, a French translation contained in 
[Sebestik 1964, 136-1641. In 1817 the work was published sepa- 
rately in Prague; a year later it also appeared in Volume 5 of 
the Abhandlunqen der kaniqlichen bijhmischen Gesellschaft der 
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Wissenschaften for 1818. It should be noted that Jourdain [1905] 
contains a considerable number of misprints, some of which have 
been retained in later editions. It is hoped that they have all 
been eliminated from the present edition. There are Czechoslova- 
kian and Russian translations which have not been consulted. Full 
details of these and the various editions of all Bolzano's works 
are to be found in the Bolzano Biblioqraphie [1972], Vol E 2/I 
of the Bolzano-Gesamtausqabe (complete works), currently being 
published by Fromann-Holzbooq of Stuttgart. For the sake of 
completeness it may be noted that very brief extracts from the 
Preface and Section 7 of Bolzano's paper appeared in a "modernized," 
English version in Birkhoff 11973, 15-161. For convenience, 
fn) 1 1 
Bolzano's notations ix, Fx, u, W have been rendered: F,x, 
F(zI)x, ulr and ~1. 
The five early mathematical works published by Bolzano are 
listed below: 
(1) Betrachtunqen iiber einiqe Geqenstsnde der Elementarqeo- 
metrie [Considerations on some objects of elementary geometry]. 
1804, Prague. (63 pp.) 
(2) Beytr;iqe zu einer beqriindeteren Darstellunq der Mathe- 
matik Erste Lieferunq. [Contributions to a more well-founded 
presentation of mathematics]. 1810, Prague. (152 pp.) 
(3) Der binomische Lehrsatz, und als Folqerunq aus ihm der 
polynomische, und die Reihen, die zur Berechnunq des Logarithmen 
und ExponentialqrBssen dienen, qenauer als bisher erwiesen [The 
binomial theorem, and as a consequence of it the polynomial theo- 
rem, and the series, which serve for the calculation of loqa- 
rithmic and exponential quantities, proved more strictly than 
before]. 1816, Prague. (144 pp.) 
(4) Die drey Probleme der Rectification, der Complanation 
und der Cubirunq, ohne Betrachtung des unendlich Kleinen, ohne 
die Annahme des Archimedes, und ohne irqend eine nicht strenq 
erweisliche Voraussetzung qeliist; zuqleich als Probe einer q&z- 
lichen Umstaltunq der Raumwissenschaft, allen Mathematikern zur 
Priifunq vorgeleqt ]The three problems of rectification, complana- 
tion, and cubature, solved without consideration of the infinitely 
small, without the hypotheses of Archimedes, and without any as- 
sumption which is not strictly provable; at the same time being 
presented for the scrutiny of all mathematicians as a sample of 
a complete reorganization of the science of space]. 1817, Leipzig. 
(80 pp.) 
(5) Rein analytischer Beweis des Lehrsatzes, dass zwischen 
je zwey Werthen, die ein entqeqenqesetztes Resultat qewshren, 
wenigstens eine reelle Wurzel der Gleichunq liege [Purely analytic 
proof of the theorem that between any two values which give 
results of opposite sign there lies at least one real root of the 
equation]. 1817, Prague. (60 pp.) 
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English translations of all five of these works have now 
been completed and they form an appendix to the author's doctoral 
thesis on Bolzano's early mathematical work [Russ 19801. 
PURELY ANALYTIC PROOF OF THE THEOREM 
THAT BETWEEN ANY TWO VALUES WHICH GIVE RESULTS OF OPPOSITE 
SIGN THERE LIES AT LEAST ONE REAL ROOT OF THE EQUATION 
BY BERNARD BOLZANO 
PREFACE 
There are two propositions in the theory of equations of 
which it could still be said, until recently, that a completely 
correct proof was unknown. One is the proposition: that between 
any two values of the unknown quantity which give results of 
opposite sign there must always lie at least one real root of 
the equation. The other is: that every algebraic rational 
integral function of one variable quantity can be divided into 
real factors of first or second degree. After several unsuc- 
cessful attempts by D'Alembert, Euler, de Foncenex, Lagrange, 
Laplace, Kliigel, and others at proving the latter proposition 
Gauss finally supplied, last year, two proofs which leave very 
little to be desired. Indeed, this outstanding scholar had 
already presented us with a proof of this proposition in 1799l, 
but it had, as he admitted, the defect that it proved a purely 
analytic truth on the basis of a geometrical consideration. But 
his two most recent proofs2 are quite free of this defect; the 
trigonometric functions which occur in them can, and must, be 
understood in a purely analytical sense [l]. 
The other proposition mentioned above is not one which so 
far has concerned scholars to any great extent. Nevertheless, 
we do find mathematicians of great repute concerned with the 
proposition, and already different kinds of proof have been 
attempted. To be convinced of this one need only compare the 
various treatments of the proposition which have been given by, 
for example, K;istner,3 Clairaut,4 Lacroix,5 Metternich,6 Kliigel,7 
lDanonstratio nova Theorematis, omnem functionem algebraicam ratio- 
nalem integram unius variabilis in factores reales primi vel secundi 
gradus resolvi posse. Helmstadii. 4O 1799. 
'Demonstratio nova altera, etc., and Demonstratio nova tertia: both 
1816. 
21 
3Anfangsgriinde der Analysis endlicher Griissen. 3rd ed., Sect. 316. 
4El&nens d'algebre. 5th ed., Supplemens, Chap. I, No. 16. 
'El6mens d'algsbre. 7th ed. 
61n his translation of the above work of Lacroix. Mains, 1811. Sect. 
1. 
71n his Mathematisches tirterbuch. vol. 2, pp. 447 ff. 
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Lagrange,8 R&sling,' and several others. 
However, a more careful examination very soon shows that none 
of these proofs can be viewed as adequate. 
I. The most common kind of proof depends on a truth borrowed 
from geometry, namely, that every continuous line of simple cur- 
vature of which the ordinates are first positive and then neqa- 
tive (or conversely) must necessarily intersect the x-axis some- 
where at a point that lies in between those ordinates. There 
is certainly no question concerning the correctness, nor indeed 
the obviousness, of this geometrical propositon. But it is 
clear that it is an intolerable offense against correct method 
to derive truths of pure (or general) mathematics (i.e., arith- 
metic, algebra, analysis) from considerations which belong to a 
merely applied (or special) part, namely, geometry. Indeed, have 
we not long felt and recognized the incongruity of such usraBaaIs 
'ElS 'ahho YEVOS [2]? Have we not already avoided this whenever 
possible in hundreds of other cases and regarded this avoidance 
as a merits0 So if we wish to be consistent must we not try 
to do the same here? For in fact, if one considers that the 
proofs of the science should not merely be confirmations [Gewiss- 
machungen], but rather justifications [Begrtindungen], i.e., 
presentations of the objective reason for the truth concerned, 
then it is self-evident that the strictly scientific proof, or 
the objective reason, of a truth which holds equally for all 
quantities, whether in space or not, cannot possibly lie in a 
truth which holds merely for quantities which are in space. On 
this view it may, on the contrary, be seen that such a geometrical 
proof is, in this as in most cases, really circular. For while 
the geometrical truth to which we refer here is (as we have al- 
ready said) extremely evident, and therefore needs no proof in 
the sense of confirmation, it nonetheless needs justification. 
For its component concepts are obviously so combined that one 
cannot hesitate for a moment to say that it is not one of those 
simple truths which are called basic propositions [GrundsZtze], 
or basic truths, because they are only the reason for other 
truths and never themselves consequences. On the contrary, it 
is a theorem or consequent-truth [Folgewahrheit]; i.e., such a 
truth that has its basis in certain other truths and, therefore, 
in the science, it must be proved by a derivation from these 
other truths [31.11 
Consider now the objective reason why a line in the above- 
'Trait6 de la r&solution des 6quations numgriques de tous les degr&. 
Paris, 1808. 
qGrundlehren van den Formen, Differenzen, Differentialien und Inte- 
gralien der Functionen. Teil I, Sect. 49. 
loThe papers of Professor Gauss quoted earlier provide an example. 
'lCompare my Beytr;ige zu einer begrtindeteren Darstellung der Mathematik 
[lst issue (Prague, 18101, Sect. II, subsections 2,10,20,21], where the 
logical concepts, which I have assumed here as known, are developed further. 
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mentioned circumstances intersects the x-axis. Everyone will, 
no doubt, see very soon that this reason lies in nothing other 
than that general truth, as a result of which every continuous 
function of x which is positive for one value of x, and negative 
for another, must be zero for some intermediate value of x. And 
this is precisely the truth which is to be proved. It is there- 
fore quite wrong to have allowed the latter to be derived from 
the former (as happens in the kind of proof we are examining). 
Rather, conversely, the former must be derived from the latter 
if we wish to represent the truths in the science in the same 
way as they are connected to each other in their objective co- 
herence. 
II. No less objectionable is the proof which some have 
constructed from the concept of the continuity of a function with 
the inclusion of the concepts of time and motion. "If two func- 
tions fx and $x," they say, "vary according to the law of conti- 
nuity, and if for x = cl, fa < C$CX, but for x = B,fB > $6, then 
there must be some value u lying between CI and 6 for which fu= +u. 
For if one imagines that the variable quantity x, in both these 
functions, gradually takes all values between c1 and f3, and the 
same value is always taken by them both at the same moments, then 
at the beginning of this continuous change in x, fx < ox, and 
at the end, fx > ox. But since both functions, by virtue of 
their continuity, must first go through all intermediate values 
before they can reach a higher value, there must be some inter- 
mediate moment at which they are both equal to one another." 
This is further illustrated by the example of the motion of two 
bodies, one of which is initially behind the other and later 
ahead of the other. It necessarily follows that at one time it 
must have been going beside the other. 
No one will deny that the concepts of time and motion are 
just as foreign to general mathematics as the concept of space. 
Nevertheless, if these two concepts were introduced here only 
for the sake of clarification, we would have nothing against 
them. For we are in no way party to such an exaggerated purism, 
which demands, in order to keep the science free from everything 
alien, that in its exposition one can never use an expression 
borrowed from another field, even if only in a metaphorical sense 
and with the purpose of describing a fact more briefly and clearly 
than could be done by a strictly literal description; nor even 
if it is just to avoid the jarring of the constant repetition 
of the same word, or so as to remember, by the mere name given 
to a thing, an example which would serve to confirm the asser- 
tion. Thus it may be noted that we do not regard examples and 
applications as detracting in the least from the perfection of 
a scientific exposition. On the other hand, we strictly require 
only this: that examples never be put forward instead of proofs 
and that the essence [Wesenheitl of a deduction never be based 
on the merely metaphorical use of phrases or on their related 
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ideas, so that the deduction itself would become void as soon 
as these were changed. 
In accord with these views, the inclusion of the concept of 
time in the above proof may still perhaps be excused, because no 
conclusion is based on phrases which contain it which would not 
also hold without it. But in no way can the last illustration 
about the motion of a body be viewed as anything more than a 
mere example which does not prove the proposition, but rather is 
only to be proved by it. 
(a) So let us drop this example and examine the rest of the 
reasoning. Let us first note that this is based on an incorrect 
concept of continuity. According to a correct definition, the 
expression that a function fx varies according to the law of 
continuity for all values of x inside or outside certain limits 12 
means just that: if x is some such value, the difference 
f(x + w) - fx can be made smaller than any given quantity provided 
w can be taken as small as we please [4]. With the notation I 
introduced in Section 14 of Binomische Lehrsatz, etc. (Prague, 
18161, this is f(x + w) = fx + R IS]. But, as assumed in this 
proof, the continuous function is one which never reaches a 
higher value without first going through all lower values: i.e., 
f(x + nAx) can take every value between fx and f(x + Ax) as n 
takes arbitrary values between 0 and 1. That is certainly a 
very true assertion, but it cannot be viewed as a definition of 
the concept of continuity: rather, it is a theorem about con- 
tinuity. Indeed, it is a theorem which can only be proved on the 
assumption of the proposition which here it was desired to prove 
by the theorem. For if M is some quantity between fx and 
f(x + Ax,, then the assertion that there is a value of n between 
0 and 1 for which f(x + nAx) = M is only a special case of the 
general truth, that if fx < 4x, and f (x + Ax) > $(x + Ax), then 
there must be some intermediate value x + nAx for which 
f(x + nAx) = $(x + nhx). The first assertion comes from this 
general truth in the case in which the function 9x has constant 
value M. 
(b) But even supposing one could prove this proposition in 
another way, the proof which we are examining would have yet 
another error. From the fact that fa > $a and ff3 < $6, it would 
only follow that, if u were some value lying between a and f3 for 
which +u is >$a but ~$8, then fx would become equal to C$U in 
going from fa to fB; i.e., for some x lying between c( and 8, 
fx = @l. But whether this happens for just the same value of 
x which is equal to u, i.e., (because u can be any arbitrary 
"There are functions which vary continuously for all values of their 
root, e.g., a+Bx. But there are others which are continuous only for 
values of their root inside or outside certain limits. Thus x+ +iiGi 
is continuous only for values of XC +1 or >+2 but not for values between 
+l and +2. 
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value lying between a and f3 which makes @.I > @a and ~$6)~ whether 
there is some value of x lying between cx and 6 for which both 
functions fx and $x are equal to one another, this would still 
not follow. 
(c) The deceptiveness of the whole proof rests mainly on 
the inclusion of the concept of time. For if this were omitted 
it would be seen immediately that the proof was nothing but a 
repetition, in different words, of the proposition to be proved. 
For to say that the function fx, before it passes from the state 
of being smaller than @IX to that of being greater, must first go 
through the state of being equal to ox is to say, without the 
concept of time, that among the values that fx takes, if one puts 
in every value of x between ct and f3, there is one that makes 
fx = #lx. This is exactly the proposition to be proved. 
III. Others prove our proposition on the basis of the 
following (either quite without proof or merely supported by some 
examples borrowed from geometry): "Every variable quantity can 
pass from a positive to a negative state only through the state 
of being zero or infinity." Now since the value of an equation 
cannot be infinitely large for any finite value of the root, 
they conclude that any transition here must occur through zero. 
(a) If we wish to detach from the above proposition the 
metaphorical idea of a transition, which contains the concept of 
a change in time and space, thereby also omitting the senseless 
expression of a state of nonexistence [61, then we eventually 
arrive at the following proposition: "If a variable quantity 
which depends on another quantity x is positive for x = cx and 
negative for x = B, there is always a value of x lying between 
a and i3 for which the quantity is zero or one for whi.ch it is 
infinite.'" Now everyone surely perceives that such a compound 
assertion is not basic truth but would have to be proved, and 
that its proof could hardly be easier than the very proposition 
which we wish to establish. 
(b) Indeed, a closer examination shows that the assertion 
is fundamentally identical to the proposition. For it must not 
be forgotten that this assertion is actually true only if it 
refers to quantities which vary continuously. Thus, for example, 
the function x + (x-2) (x+1) is positive for x = +2 and negative 
for x = -1; yet ause it does-not vary within these limits 
according to the law of continuity, there is no value x between 
2 and -1 for which the function is zero or infinite. However, 
if we confine the assertion simply to quantities which vary 
continuously we must also exclude those functions which become 
infinite for a certain value of their root. For a function such 
as a/(b-x) does not actually vary continuously for all values 
of x, but only for all values which are greater or less than b. 
For the function does not have any determinate value when x = b, 
but it becomes what is called infinitely great. So it cannot be 
said that the values which it takes for x = b + w. all of which 
164 s. B. Russ HM7 
are determinate, can come as close as desired to the value it has 
for x=b. And this is a part of the concept of continuity (II a). 
Now let us add the concept of continuity to the above assertion, 
while omitting the case in which the function becomes infinite. 
It then becomes, word for word, the original proposition we had 
to prove: namely, that every continuously variable function of 
x which is positive for X=CX and negative for x = 6 must be zero 
for some value between c1 and B. 
IV. In some works the following argument can be found: 
"Because fx is positive for x = c1 and negative for x = 6, there 
must be between cx and (3 two quantities a and b at which the 
transition from the positive values to the negative values of 
fx takes place, so that between a and b no more values of x 
occur for which fx would still be positive or negative," etc. 
This error scarcely needs refuting and would not be introduced 
here if it did not serve to prove how unclear are the concepts 
of even some reputable mathematicians on this subject. It is 
well enough known that between any two nearby values of an inde- 
pendent variable, such as the root x of a function, there are 
always infinitely many intermediate values. And in the same way 
that there is no last x for a continuous function which makes it 
positive and no first x which makes it negative, so there are no 
numbers a and b as here described! 
V. The failure of these attempts to prove directly the propo- 
sition with which we are concerned leads to the idea of deriving 
it from the second proposition which we mentioned at the begin- 
ning, namely, from the divisibility of every function into certain 
factors. There is also no doubt that if the latter is conceded, 
the former can be concluded from it. But the fact is that such 
a derivation could not be called a strictly scientific justifica- 
tion, in that the second proposition clearly expresses a much 
more complex truth than the first. Therefore, the second can 
certainly be based on the first, but not, conversely, the first 
on the second. No one has really succeeded yet in proving the 
second without presupposing the first. With regard to the proofs, 
the unacceptability of which Gauss has already shown in his paper 
of 1799 171, it is because they have already been shown to be 
unacceptable that it is unnecessary to investigate whether or not 
they are based on our present proposition. The proof of Laplace,13 
likewise, has its faults, which we need not point out here because 
the proof is explicitly based on our proposition. Also, we need 
not consider the first proof of Gauss, because it relies on 
geometrical considerations. Moreover, it would be easy to show 
that even in that proof our proposition is implicitly accepted, 
in that the geometrical considerations which are employed in it 
are quite similar to those which we mentioned in I. So it all 
131n the Journal de l'&ole Normale, or also in S. F. Lacroix, Trait6 
du calcul diffhentiel et int&ral. T. I. Nos. 162,163. 
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depends on the Demonstratio nova altera and tertia of Gauss. The 
former refers explicitly to our proposition, when it presupposes 
on page 30: aequationem ordinis imparis certo solubilem esse [8]-- 
an assertion which is well known to be nothing but an easy con- 
sequence of our proposition. It is not so obvious that the Demon- 
strati0 nova tertia depends on our proposition. It is based, 
among other things, on the following theorem: if a function 
remains positive for all values of its variable quantity x which 
lie between CI and 8, then its integral taken from x = a to x = 8 
has a positive value. Now in the proof given by LagrangeI for 
this theorem, no explicit reference to our proposition is to be 
found. However, this proof of Lagrange still has a gap. It is 
required that the quantity i be taken sufficiently small that 
f(x+i)-fx 
i 
_ f,x < f'x + f'(x+i) + f'(x+2i) + a** + f'(x+ (n-l)i), 
n 
where the product ien is to remain equal to a given quantity, and 
the well-known notation f'x represents the first derived function 
of fx. Now the question arises, is it possible to satisfy this 
requirement? However small one takes i, so as to diminish the 
difference 
f(x+i) - fx _ f,x 
the divisor of the right-hand side, n, must be taken that much 
greater, if i-n is to remain constant. Moreover, the set of 
terms in the numerator increases; but whether this increase in the 
numerator is proportional to an increase in the denominator, or 
whether the value of the whole fraction is decreased by the 
decrease in i, by as much as, or by more than, the expression 
f(x+i) - fx _ f,x 
i 
is yet to be shown. Now if this gap is to be filled, it can 
surely only be done with reference to our present proposition, 
since we had to refer to the latter for the proof of a theorem [9]15 
which, although much simpler, is related to this proof of Lagrange. 
Thus all the previous proofs of the proposition which forms the 
title of this paper are defective. Now the one which I put forward 
here for the judgment of scholars contains, I flatter myself, not a 
mere confirmation, but the objective justification of the truth to be 
14Legon~ sur le calcul des fonctions. Paris, 1806. Nouvelle ed., Let. 9, 
p. 89. 
"Namely, the proposition of Section 29 in the paper: Der Binomische 
Lehrsatz, etc. 
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proved; i.e., it is strictly scientific-l6 
The following is a short summary of the method adopted. 
The truth to be proved, that between any two values c1 and 
6 which give results of opposite sign there always lies at least 
one real root, clearly rests on the more general truth that, if 
two continuous functions of X, fx and $x, have the property that 
for x = CI, fa < Qcx, and for x = 6, fB > $6, there must always be 
some value of x lying between c( and 8 for which fx = 4x. How- 
ever, if fa < $a, then by the law of continuity it is possible 
that f(a+i) < $(a+i), if i is taken small enough. The property 
of being smaller, therefore, belongs to the function of i re- 
presented by the expression f(cl+i), for all values smaller than 
a certain value. Nevertheless this property does not hold for 
all values of i without restriction, namely not for an i = B-a, 
for f$ is already >$B. Now the theorem holds that whenever a 
certain property M belongs to all values of a variable quantity 
i which are smaller than a given value and yet not for all values 
in general, then there is always some greatest value u, for which 
it can be asserted that all i < u possess property M. For this 
value of i itself f(a+u) cannot be < $(e+u), because then, by 
the law of continuity, f(cz+u+W) < $(a+u+w) if w were taken 
small enough. And consequently it would not be true that u is the 
greatest of the values.for which the assertion holds, that all lower 
values of i make f (a + i) < $~(a + i); for u + w would be a still 
greater value for which this holds. But still less can it be true that 
f(a+u) > $(a+u), for then f (a+~-w) > $(a+~-W) wouldalso be true 
if w were taken sufficiently small, and consequently, it would not 
be true that for all values of i <u, f(a+i) < $(a+i). So there- 
fore it must be thatf(cr+u) =$(a+~); i.e., there is a value of x 
lying between c1 and f3, namely, CL + u, for which the functions 
fx and 4x are equal to one another. It is now only a question 
of the proof of the theorem mentioned. The theorem is proved 
by showing that those values of i of which it can be asserted 
that all smaller values possess property M and those of which 
this cannot be asserted can be brought as near one another as 
desired. Whence it follows, for anyone who has a correct concept 
of quantity, that the idea of a greatest value i of which it can 
be said that all below it possess property M is the idea of a 
real, i.e., actual, quantity. 
Before I finish this preface I may be allowed to make a 
confession and a request which apply not only to the present, 
but to all my writings and, God willing, to my future ones as well. 
16Yet it is not to be expected that I comply here with all the rules 
which I myself set out in the Beytrlge zu einer begriindeteren, etc. (Pt.II), 
for the construction of a strictly scientific exposition. For although I 
am completely convinced of the correctness of these rules, to follow them 
precisely is only possible when one begins the exposition of a science from 
its first propositions and concepts, not where one is only dealing with 
some theories taken out of the context of the whole. This observation 
obviously,also applies to the paper on the binomial theorem. 
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A careful reader could already have gathered from the few 
writings which have appeared so far, but particularly from that 
outline of a new logic which is supplied in the first issue of 
Beytr;ige zu einer begriindetere: Darstellung der Mathematik in 
its second section, entitled "Uber die mathematische Methode," that 
I hold certain views which, if they are not found to be completely 
incorrect, must lead to a complete reorganization in all pure a 
priori sciences. The greatest and most important part of these 
views I have already examined for such a long time and with so 
much impartiality that it is not premature for me to venture to 
speak more openly about them. Views which embrace the whole 
domain of one or more sciences can be made known in two ways. 
They can be stated either once and for all in a composite work 
or gradually in individual papers. The first way has been by 
far the most usual, up to the present time, and it'is certainly 
the procedure anyone should adopt if he merely wants to achieve 
a reputation among his academic contemporaries as quickly as 
possible. But for the perfection of the sciences, I regard the 
second procedure to be much more advantageous for the following 
reasons. 
First, because in this way the author who has discovered 
some new ideas runs much less danger of being rushed. For the 
gradual presentation of his opinions allows him to postpone to 
a later time his explanation of points about which he was initially 
in doubt himself. He can learn from the criticisms which work 
already published receives, and still correct some things which 
had been incorrect. 
Second, with such a serial development of his views, he can 
also expect a far stricter examination on the part of the reader. 
For the author who presents an already completed system offers for 
our immediate attention more new assertions than he could expect 
anyone to examine with as much care as if they had been presented 
individually. The author who supplies a complete theory shows, 
or at least should show, how those undeniable truths of common 
sense can be derived from his unusual premises. But this re- 
conciles us to those premises immediately, and we agree to them 
much more rapidly than if he had presented them individually and 
had allowed us to consider whether, and to what extent, they agree 
with the rest of what we hold to be true. Finally, it is surely 
not to be denied that the mere sight of a large, thick book which 
promises a complete system of this or that science.instills in 
us a kind of reverence before we have even read it. Now if we 
discover, through reading it, a certain coherence in the asser- 
tions, if the structure of human knowledge sketched out there has 
a pleasing form, and if everything is set out according to size 
and number and symmetry, then our judgment is affected and we 
even begin to wish that here, at last, might be that single 
correct system which we have sought for so long. And the least 
that occurs is that because of the coherence observed, we imagine 
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that we must either accept or reject the entire system, when in 
fact neither the one nor the other should happen! 
These were the main reasons for which I decided in 1804 not 
to begin in any science with the publication of a complete text- 
book, but first to make known these unusual concepts of mine in 
individual papers. And if, after much correction, these have 
found favor with a part of the public, only then should the 
preparation of an entire system be considered. That is, unless 
death does not oblige us to leave this latter task to others. 
I began my written output with a paper concerning mathematics, 
under the title Betrachtungen iiher einige Gegenstznde der Elemen- 
targeometrie (Prague: C. Barth, 1804). In this I put forward 
a new theory of parallels',17 as well as several other views. Some 
years later I resolved to publish all my views in the area of 
mathematics in serial form, under the title Beytrh'ge zu einer 
begriindeteren Darstellung der Mathematik. But the first of these 
issues (Prague: C. Widtmann, 1810) had the misfortune, despite 
the importance of its contents, of not even being announced or 
reviewed in some learned journals, and in others only very super- 
ficially. This forced me to postpone continuing these contribu- 
tions to a later time and meanwhile to attempt simply to make 
myself better known to the learned world by publishing some papers 
which, by their titles, would be more likely to arouse attention. 
Thus the paper already mentioned, Der binomische Lehrsatz, etc., 
appeared in 1816 (Prague: Enders). My hope is that the present 
paper will also serve this purpose; in addition, its publication 
was necessary because in the earlier paper I referred to the 
proposition proved here. Some other papers are also written 
and ready for printing, e.g., one with the title Die drey Probleme 
der Rectification, der Complanation, und der Cubirung, ohne 
Betrachtung des unendlich Kleinen, ohne die Annahmen des Archimedes 
und ohne irgend eine nicht streng erweisliche Voraussetzunq gel&t. 
These still await their publisher [lo]. 
If I should continue in this way, which seems to me the best, 
then the only favor I must ask of the public is that this single 
paper should not be overlooked because of its small extent, but 
rather examined with all possible strictness, and the results 
of this examination made known publicly. In this manner what is 
perhaps unclear may be clearly explained and what is quite in- 
correct will be retracted. The sooner truth and correctness gain 
general assent, the better. 
17This theory might deserve attention for at least two reasons: first, 
because it is the only one in which no obvious error has been detected; 
second, because the greatest living French geometer Legendre hit upon just 
the same view quite independently of me in the tenth edition of his El&tents 
de g&om&rie (Paris, 1813). 
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1 
Convention ill]. Suppose that for a series of quantities 
the special case does not occur that all the terms after a certain 
term are zero, as happens, for example, after the (n + 1)th term 
in the binomial series for every positive integer exponent n. 
Then it is obvious that the value of this series, that is, the 
quantity resulting from summing its terms, cannot always remain 
the same if the set of terms is arbitrarily increased. On the 
contrary, this value must certainly change every time the number 
of terms is increased by a single one which is not zero. Hence 
the value of a series depends not only on the rule which de- 
termines the construction of the individual terms, but also on 
their number. So the value represents a variable quantity even 
though the form and magnitude of the individual terms remain 
unchanged. With this in mind, we denote a function of x which 
consists of an arbitrarily long series of terms and whose value 
therefore depends, apart from x, on the number of terms r, by 
Fcr) (x) or F,x. So, for example, A f Bx + Cx2 + -0. + Rxr = Frx, 
and on the other hand, 
A + Bx + Cx2 + l ** + Rxr + -0. + .SX~+~ = Flr+sI~. 
2 
1st Lemma. The change in value, i.e., the increase or de- 
crease in value, which occurs in a series by increasing its 
number of terms by a definite set (e.g., by one), can be, accord- 
ing to circumstances; a constant quantity (if, namely, the terms 
of the series are all equal) but also may be variable. In the 
latter case, the change may be a quantity which increases for a 
while and decreases for a while, or one which increases or de- 
creases steadily. Thus the change in the series 
1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + -*a, 
if it is increased by one term, is a constant quantity. The 
change in the series 
a + ae f ae 2 + ae3 + . . . 
by an increase of one term is a variable quantity, provided e # 1. 
It becomes ever larger if e > kl, and ever smaller if e < fl 
[see note 41. 
2nd Lemma. If the change (increase or decrease) in a series 
due to the increase in its set of terms by a definite number (e.g., 
one) always remains the same or even always increases --and if 
in both cases it retains the same sign--then it is clear that the 
value of this series will become greater than any given quantity 
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if it is continued far enough. For suppose the growth in the 
series by an increase of every n terms is 2 d and it is required 
that the series be made larger than a given value D. Then one 
need only take a whole number r which is 2 D/d and extend the 
series by r-n terms, thereby obtaining an increase which is 
2 (r.d 1. (D/d)*d = D). 
4 
3rd Lemma. But there are also series whose values, however 
far they may be continued, never exceed a certain quantity. The 
series 
a - a + a - a + **a, 
is of this type; its value, however far it is continued, is 
always either 0 or a and therefore never exceeds a. 
4th Lemma. Particularly interesting among such series is 
the class of series having the property that the change in value 
(increase or decrease) due to any further continuation of terms 
always remains smaller than a certain quantity, which itself can 
be taken as small as desired, provided the series has been 
continued far enough beforehand. That there are such series is 
proved not only by series in which the terms after a certain point 
are all zero (and which therefore really have no continuation 
after this term and are no more capable of changing value than 
the binomial series of Section l), but also by series in which the 
terms decrease at the same rate, or faster than, the terms of a 
geometric progression with ratio a proper fraction. For the 
value of the geometric series 
a + ae + ae 2+ -  l -  + aer 
is well known to be = a(l-er+l)/(l-e). And if this series is 
extended by s terms, then the increase is 
r+l r+2 r+s r+l ae + ae + ae 
L-+3 + 
l * *  + ae = ae (l-es)/(l-e). 
Now if e < ?l, and r is taken sufficiently large, then this in- 
crease remains smaller than any given quantity, however large 
s becomes. For, because es always remains < +l, then 
aer+l (l-es)/(l-e) is obviously always smaller than aer+l(2/(1-e)). 
But the latter can be made smaller than any given quantity by in- 
creasing r, because the value it takes for the next-larger 
value of r is simply the previous result multiplied by e, a 
constant proper fraction. (See Der binomische Lehrsatz, Section 
22) [121. Therefore every geometric progression whose ratio is 
a proper fraction can be continued far enough so that the increase 
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caused by each additional continuation must remain smaller than 
some given quantity. So this must hold more strongly for series 
whose terms decrease more rapidly than the terms of a decreasing 
geometric progression. 
6 
5th Lemma. If the values of the sums of the first n, n+l, 
n+2, . . . . n+r terms of a series such as the series of Section 5 
are denoted (Section l), respectively, by F,x, Fnflx, Fn+2x, . . . . 
F n+r x, then we regard the quantities 
Fix, F2x, F3x, . . . . Fnx, . . . . Fn+r~, . . . 
as a new series (called the series of sums of the previous series). 
Here we have assumed the special property that the difference 
between the nth term Fnx and every later term F,+,x (no matter 
how far from the nth term) remains smaller than any given quantity 
if n has been taken large enough in the first place. This differ- 
ence is the increase to the original series by the continuation 
beyond the nth term, and this increase can remain, by assumption, 
as small as desired if n has been taken large enough in the first 
place. 
7 
Theorem. If a series of quantities 
Fix, F2x, F3x, . . . . Fnx, . . . . Fn+rx,... 
has the property that the difference between its.nth term FnX and 
every later term F,+,x, however far from the former, remains 
smaller than any given quantity if n has been taken large enough, 
then there is always a certain constant quantity, and indeed 
only one, which the terms of this series approach, and to which 
they can come as close as desired if the series is continued 
far enough. 
Proof. It is clear from Section 6 that a series such as 
that described in the theorem is possible. Also, there is 
certainly nothing impossible in assuming the existence of the 
quantity X which the terms of the series approach arbitrarily 
closely, provided the quantity is not assumed to be unique 
and invariable. For if it is a quantity which can vary then it 
can, of course, always be taken so that it is suitably near, or 
even exactly the same as, the term Fnx with which it is being 
compared. But the assumption of an invariable quantity with this 
property of proximity to the terms of our series is not impossi- 
ble because with this assumption it is possible to determine the 
quantity as accurately as desired. For suppose it is required 
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that X be determined so accurately that the difference from the 
true value of X will not exceed a small given quantity d. Then 
one simply looks in the given series for a term Fnx with the 
property that every term Fn+rx following it differs by less than 
fd. There must be such an Fnx by assumption. I now say the 
value of Fnx differs from the true value of X by at most ?d. For 
if r is increased arbitrarily, with the same n, the difference 
X - Fn+rx = +w can be made as small as desired; but the difference 
FnX - Fn+rx always remains < ?d, however large r is taken. There- 
fore the difference, 
X - Fnx = (X - F,,+,x) - (Fnx - Fn+rx), 
must always remain < 5 (d+w). But since for the same n this is a 
constant quantity, and w can be made as small as required by in- 
creasing r, then X - FnX must be 5 +d. For if it were greater 
and, e.g., equal to +(d+e) it would be impossible for the rela- 
tion d+e < d+w, i.e., e < w, to hold if w is further reduced. 
Therefore, the true value of X differs from the value of the 
term Fnx by at most d, and can thus be determined as accurately 
as required since d can be made arbitrarily small. There is, 
therefore, a real quantity which the terms of the series, if it 
is continued far enough, approach as closely as desired. But 
there is only one such quantity. For, suppose that besides 
X there is another constant quantity Y which the terms of the 
series, if it is continued far enough, approach as closely as 
desired; then the differences, X - Fn+rx = w and Y - Fn+rx = ~1, 
can be made as small as desired if r is taken large enough. 
Therefore this also holds for their own difference, i.e., for 
X - Y = w - ~1, which, if X and Y are constant quantities, is 
impossible if one does not suppose X = Y. 
8 
Remark. If one tries to determine the value of the quantity 
X in the manner described in the previous section, namely, 
through one of the terms from which the given series is composed, 
then one will never determine X completely accurately unless the 
terms of this series from some point on are all equal. But one 
must beware of concluding from this that the quantity X is al- 
ways irrational. For if we consider the series, 
0.1; 0.11; 0.111; 0.1111; . . . 
(which is the series of sums of the geometrical progression 
l/10; l/100; l/1000; 1/10000; . ..) 
then the quantity which the terms approach as closely as desired 
is not irrational, but the fraction l/9. So from the fact that 
a quantity cannot be determined accurately in a certain way, it 
does not follow that it cannot be completely determined in any 
other way, and is therefore irrational. 
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9 
Lemma. If, therefore, some given series has the property 
that each term is finite, but the change which it undergoes on 
every further continuation is smaller than any given quantity, 
provided only that the number of terms taken in the first place 
is large enough, then there is always one and only one constant 
quantity which comes as close to the value of this series as 
desired, if it is continued far enough. For, such a series is 
of the kind described in Section 5; and, hence, the values which 
are the sums of the n, n+l, n+2, . . . terms form a series like 
those of Sections 6 and 7. Therefore such a series has the 
property proved in Section 7. 
10 
Remark. It should not be thought that in the proposition 
of Section 9 the condition- "that the change (increase or decrease) 
which the series undergoes on every continuation must remain 
smaller than any given quantity if it has been continued far 
enough beforehand"- is superfluous, and that the proposition could 
perhaps be expressed with greater generality: "If it is possible 
to make the terms of a series, when continued, ever smaller and 
as small as desired, then there is always a constant quantity 
which the value of the series, when continued, approaches as 
closely as desired." This assertion would be contradicted im- 
mediately by the following example. The terms of the series 
l/2 + l/3 + l/4 + l/5 + *a* 
can be made as small as desired, and yet it is a well-known fact, 
from the properties of a rectangular hyperbola (but also deriv- 
able from purely arithmetic considerations), that, if the series 
is continued far enough, its value can become greater than any 
given quantity. 
11 
Preliminary note. In investigations of applied mathematics 
the situation often arises in which a definite property M is 
known to belong to all values of a variable quantity x which are 
smaller than a certain u, without its being known whether this 
property belongs to all values which are greater than u. In 
such cases there may be some ul > u for which, in the same way 
that it holds for u, all values of x below it possess property 
M. This property M may even belong to all values of x without 
exception. But if this is known, that M does not belong to all 
x in general, then by combining these two conditions it will be 
correct to conclude: there is a certain quantity U which is the 
greatest of those for which it is true that all smaller values 
of x possess property M. This is proved in the following theorem. 
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12 
Theorem. If a property M does not belong to all values of 
a variable x, but does belong to all values which are less than 
a certain u, then there is always a quantity U which is the 
greatest of those of which it can be asserted that all smaller 
x have property M. 
Proof. 1. Because property M holds for all x smaller than 
u, but not for all x in general, there is some quantity V = u + D 
(where D represents something positive) for which it can be said 
that M does not belong to all x < V = u + D. If I then ask the 
question--whether M belongs to all x < u + D/2m, where the ex- 
ponent m is first 0, then 1, then 2, then 3, etc.--I am sure 
the first of my questions will have to be denied. For the 
question whether M belongs to all x < u + D/2O, is the same as 
the question whether M belongs to all x < zz + D, which is denied 
by assumption. So it is a matter of whether all the succeeding 
questions, as m is put larger and larger, will be denied. 
Should this be the case, it is clear that u itself is the greatest 
value for which the assertion holds that all smaller x have 
property M. For if there were a greater, e.g., u + d, the asser- 
tion would hold that all x < u + d have property M; but then it 
is clear that if I take m large enough, u + D/2m will at one 
time be < u + d, and consequently if M belongs to all x < u + d, 
it also belongs to all x < u + D/2m; therefore we would not have 
denied this question but must have affirmed it. Thus it is 
proved that in this case (when all the above questions are denied) 
there is a certain quantity V (namely u itself) which is the 
greatest for which the assertion holds that all x below it pos- 
sess property M. 
2. However, if one of the above questions is affirmed, and 
m is the definite value of the exponent for which it is first 
affirmed (m can be 1 but, as we have seen, not 01, then I now 
know that property M belongs to all x < u + D/2m, but not to all 
x < u + 0/2m-1. But the difference between u + D/2m and 
u + D/2"-l is equal to D/2m. Therefore, if, as above with the 
difference D, I ask the question whether M belonqs to all 
X < U + D/2m + D/2m+n, and here the exponent n is first 0, then 
1, then 2, etc; then I am again sure that at least the first 
question will have to be denied. For asking whether M belongs 
to all x < u + D/2m + D/2m+0 is the same as asking whether 
M belongs to all x < u + D/2m-1, which had already been denied. 
But if all my succeeding questions are denied as I make n larger 
and larger, then, as before, u + D/2m is that greatest value, 
or the U, for which the assertion holds that all x below it 
possess the property M. 
3. However, if one of these questions is affirmed, and 
this happens first for the definite value n, then I now know 
M belongs to all x < u + D/2m + D/2m+n, but not to all 
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X < u + D/2m + D/2*-1. The difference between these two 
quantities is equal to D/2m+n, and I repeat the procedure as 
before with D/2m, etc. 
4. If I continue in this way as long as desired, it may 
be seen that the result I finally obtain must be one of two 
things. 
(a) I may find a value of the form u + D/2m + D/2m+n + --- 
D/p+n+"'+r which is the greatest for which the assertion 
that all x below it possess property M holds. This happens 
in the case for which the questions, whether M belongs to 
all 
x c u + D/2m + D/2m+n f  l s9 + D/.p+n+...+r+S, 
are denied for every value of s. 
(b) I may find that M belongs to all 
X c u f  D/2m + D/2m+n + l -- f  D/2m+n+"-+r, 
but not to all 
x<u + D/2m + D/p+n + . . . + D/2mn+"'+r-l. 
Here I am always free to make the number of terms in these 
two quantities ever greater through new questions. 
5. Now if the first case occurs the truth of the theorem 
is already proved. In the second it may be noted that the 
quantity 
u + D/2" + D/ZmhI + --- + D/2m+n+"'+r 
represents a series whose number of terms I can increase arbi- 
trarily, and which belongs to the class described in Section 5. 
Because, depending on whether m,n ,...,r are all equal to 1 or 
some are greater than 1, it decreases at the same rate, or more 
rapidly than a geometric progression whose ratio is the proper 
fraction $. From this it follows that it has the property of 
Section 9; i.e., there is a certain constant quantity which it 
can approach as closely as desired if the number of its terms is 
sufficiently increased. Let this quantity be V; then I claim 
property M holds for all x c V. For if it did not hold for some 
x < V, e.g., for V - 6, then the quantity 
u + D/2m + D/pm3 + . . . + D/2m+n+“‘+r 
must always keep the distance 6 from V, because for all x that 
are smaller than it M should apply. For every 
x = u + D/p + D/p+n + . . . + D/p+n+-*-+r - w, 
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however small o is , possesses property M. On the other hand, 
M does not belong to x = U - 6; therefore, 
U - 6 > u + D/2* + D/2*+n + . . . + D/2"+"+"'+r - W, 
or 
U - [U + D/2* + D/2*+n + *Be + D/2m+n+"'+r] > 6 - o. 
Hence the difference between U and the series cannot be made as 
small as desired, since 6 - w cannot be made smaller than any 
given quantity. But neither can M hold for all x < U + E. For 
the value of the series 
u + o/2* + D/2m+” + .  .  .  + D/2*+n+“‘+r-1 
can be brought as close to the value of the series 
as desired because the difference between the two is only 
D/2m+n+"-+I-. Further, because the value of the latter series 
can be brought as close as desired to U, the value of the first 
series can come as close to U as desired. Therefore 
u + D/2* + D/2*+X? + .-. f D/2*+n+"'+r-1 
can certainly become < U + E. But now, by assumption, M does 
not hold for all x < u + D/2* + D/2n+n + a** + 2*+n+**.+r-1; so 
much less, therefore, does M hold for all x < U + E. Therefore 
U is the greatest value for which the assertion holds that all 
x below it possess property M. 
13 
1st Remark. The last theorem is of the greatest importance 
and is used in all areas of mathematics, as much in analysis as 
in the applied parts, geometry, chronometry, and mechanics. Not 
infrequently in the past this false proposition has served instead: 
"If a property M holds not for all x but for all smaller than a 
certain value, then there is always some greatest x to which pro- 
perty M belongs." This I say is false in view of the theorem 
just proved. For if there is some quantity U which is the 
greatest of those of which it can be said that all x below them 
have property M then there is no greatest x to which this property 
belongs provided x is either a freely or a continuously variable 
quantity. For it is well known that for a quantity that varies 
freely or according to the law of continuity, there is never a 
greatest value that is smaller ,than a certain limit U, because 
however close it may be to this limit it can always be brought 
closer. In order to illustrate this by an example, consider a 
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rectangular hyperbola; take one of its asymptotes as the x-axis 
and take the origin, not at the center c, but at another point 
a on this asymptote which is at a distance D from c. Now let 
us define the direction ac as the positive x-axis and the direc- 
tion ab which is the perpendicular ordinate at a as the positive 
y-axis. Then every x-coordinate which is smaller than a certain 
one, say smaller than D/2, has the property that its correspond- 
ing ordinate is positive. However, this property (M) will not 
hold for all positive x-coordinates, namely, not for those which 
are greater than D. Now, is there here a greatest x-coordinate 
or a greatest value of x to which property M belongs? No, but 
there is certainly a U, i.e., an x-coordinate which is the 
greatest among those of which it can be said that all smaller 
than it have positive ordinates, i.e., possess property M. This 
x-coordinate is +D. 
14 
2nd Remark. Perhaps one might conclude that the proof of 
the theorem in Section 12 could have been accomplished quite 
briefly in the following way: "If there were no greatest U of 
which the assertion holds that all x below it possess property 
M, one would always be able to take u greater and greater and 
so as great as one desired and consequently M must hold for 
all x without exception." However, this would be a very mistaken 
conclusion because it is based on the concealed assumption "that 
a quantity which can always be taken greater than it already is 
can become as great as desired." How false this is may be shown, 
for example, by the well-known series, 
++++++ . . . . 
whose value can always be made greater than it already is and 
nevertheless always remains < II We would not even mention such 
an easily discernible error if mathematicians were not guilty of 
it from time to time--as one was only recently in his “complete 
theory of parallels." 
15 
Theorem. If two functions of x, fx and 9x, vary according 
to the law of continuity either for all values x or only for 
those which lie between Q and 6, and if fa < $a and f@ > $8, then 
there is always a certain value of x between cx and B for which 
fx = 4x. 
Proof. We must remember that in this theorem the values of 
the functions fx and ox are to be compared with one another 
simply in their absolute values, i.e., without regard to signs 
or as though they were quantities incapable of being of opposite 
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signs. Hut the signs of cx and 8 are important. 
1.1. First, assume that u and 6 are both positive, and that 
(without loss of generality) B is the greater of the two; so 
B=e.+i, where i denotes a positive quantity. Now because 
fa < @IX, if w denotes a positive quantity which can be taken as 
small as desired, then f(cl + w) < $(a + w) also. For because 
fx and 4x vary continuously for all x between a and 8, and 
cx + w lies between c1 and i3 whenever w < i, one must be able to 
make f (a + w) - fa and $(a + w) - $a as small as desired if w 
is taken small enough. Hence if R and R' denote quantities which 
can be made as small as desired, f(a + W) - fct = Q, and 
+(a + w) - $a = R'. Hence, 
$(a + w) - f(a + w) = $a - fa + R' - n. 
But $a - fa equals, by assumption, some positive quantity of 
constant value A. Therefore, 
$(a + WI - f(a + w) = A + fi' - L-2, 
which remains positive if R and R' are taken small enough, i.e., 
if w is given a very small value, and this also holds for all 
smaller values. Therefore, for all values of w which are less 
than a certain one it can be asserted that the two functions 
f (a + w) and $(a + w) stand in the relation of smaller quantity 
to larger. Let us designate this property of the variable w by 
M. Then we can say that all w which are smaller than a certain 
value possess property M. But nevertheless it is clear that 
this property M does not belong to all values of w, namely, not 
for the value w = i, because f(a + i) = fB, which by assumption 
is not less than, but greater than, $(a + i) = $6. Consequently 
the theorem of Section 12 gives a certain U which is the greatest 
of those values for which it can be asserted that all w < U 
have property M. 
2. This V must lie between 0 and i. For first it cannot 
be equal to i because this would mean f(a + w) < $(a + w) when- 
ever w < i, however close it comes to the value i. But in 
exactly the same way that we have just proved that, from the 
assumption fa < $cr, the consequence f(a + w) < $(cl + w) may be 
drawn if w is taken small enough, so one can also prove that, 
from the assumption f(a + i) > $(a + i), the consequence 
f(cl + i - w) > $(c( + i - w) follows if w is taken small enough. 
Therefore it is not true that the two functions fx and 4x stand 
in the relation of smaller to greater for all values of x < a + i. 
Second, still less can it be true that U > i, because then i 
would be one of the values of w < U, and hence also 
f(a + i) < $(a + i), which directly contradicts the assumption 
of the theorem. Therefore, since it is positive, U surely lies 
between 0 and i, and consequently a + V lies between c. and 8. 
3. It may now be asked, what relation holds between fx 
and $x for the value x = c1 + U? In the first place, it cannot 
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be true that f(a + U) < $(a + U), for this would also give 
f(a + U + w) < @(a + U + w) if w is taken small enough, and 
so c1 + U would not be the greatest value for which it can be 
asserted that all x below it have property M. Nor, second, 
can it be true that f (a + U) > $(CX + U), because this would 
also give f(cl + U - w) > @(CX + U - o) if w is taken small enough 
and would therefore be against the assumption that property M is 
preserved for all x which are below c1 + U. Thus there remains on 
f(cr + U) = $(a + U), and so it is proved that there is a value 
of x lying between ct and S, namely, c1 + U, for which fx = 4x. 
II. The same proof is also applicable when c1 and (3 are 
both negative if one takes w, i, and U as negative quantities, 
because then in the same way, c1 + w, c1 + i, ct + U, and c1 + U - w 
represent quantities between c1 and (3. 
III. If c( = 0 and B is positive, then just take i (=B), 
w, and U positive; and if 8 is negative, take these others 
negative, and proof I can be used word for word. 
IV. Finally, if c1 and B are of opposite sign and (with- 
out loss of generality), e.g., c1 is negative and (3 positive, 
then the assumption of the theorem concerning the continuity of 
the functions fx and $x states that this continuity refers to 
all values of x which, if negative, are < CL, and, if positive, 
are < S [See note 41. Then among these is the value x = 0. One 
therefore investigates the relationship which holds between 
f(0) and 4(O). If f(0) = $(O) then the theorem is already 
proved. But if f(0) > $(O), then since fa < $a we have, 
by proof III, a value between 0 and ~1, and if f(0) < 4(O), a 
value between 0 and 6, for which fx = 4x. Therefore in every 
case there is a value of x between CL and 6 which makes fx = (IX. 
16 
Remark. It is no way claimed here that there is only 
a single value of x which makes fx = ox. Namely, if fcl < $a 
and f (c1 + U) = @(a + U) we must indeed have f(a + U + w) > 
$(a + U + w) if w is taken small enough, i.e., the function 
fx which before was smaller than Qx must, after they are equal 
to one another, soon become greater than $x. However, with 
ever greater increase in w it is certainly possible that before 
c1 + U + w is made equal to 6, there is a value for which again 
fx < ox. In such a case, it follows directly from our theorem 
that there must be two other values of x between c1 and i3, apart 
from U, which make fx = $x. For if f(cl+ U +x) < $(CI + U +x), 
then because f (a + U + w) was already >$(c( + U + w), there must 
be a value of x between c1 + U + w and CL + U f x, i.e., between 
c1 and 8, for which fx = (JX. And in the same way, because 
f(a + i), or f(3, is again > $6, there is also a value of x 
between cx + U fx and B which fx = @x. In this way it becomes 
clear that there must in general always be an odd number of 
values of x which make fx = @x. 
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17 
Theorem. Every function of the form a + bxm + cxn + *** + pxr 
in which m,n,... ,r designate whole positive exponents, is a quantity 
which varies according to the law of continuity for all values of 
X. 
Proof. I f  x changes to x + w, the change in the function is 
clearly equal to 
b[(X+w)m - X"] + C[(X+dn - Xni + ... + P[(X+U)~ - Xri, 
a quantity for which it can easily be shown that it can be made 
as small as desired if w is taken small enough. For by the 
binomial theorem, whose validity for whole positive powers 
(Section 8 of Der binom. Lehrs.) [13] is independent of the in- 
vestigations with'which the present paper is concerned, this 
quantity is equal to 
w 
+ncxnml + n.ffLcfl-2 w + . . . + cwn-l 
+ rpxr-1 + r.ypxr-2 w f"' +pwr-1 
The set of terms of which the factor contained in the brackets 
consists is known always to be finite and independent of the 
values of the quantities x and w. Since these occur only with 
positive powers, the value of each term, and consequently the 
whole expression, for every value of x (also for x = 0) is al- 
ways finite. But if for the same x the value of w is diminished, 
then the terms in which w appears decrease, while the others 
remain unchanged. Let us therefore designate by S the quantity 
arrived at by putting a definite value, say ~1, for w in all the 
single terms of the expression, then summing as if they all had 
the same sign. Then the actual value this expression has for 
the same WI is certainly not > S; but the value it takes for 
every smaller w is surely < S. Hence if it is required that the 
change which the function a + bxm + cxn + a.0 + pxr undergoes 
be made < D, then take an w < WI and also < D/S. Then w.S, and 
even more surely the product of w with a quantity which is < S, 
must be < D. 
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18 
Theorem. If a function of the form 
xn + axn-I + bxn-2 +**o+ PX + 91 
in which n denotes a whole positive number, is positive for x = ct 
and negative for x = 8, then the equation 
xn + axn-1 + bxn-2 +***+ px + q = 0 
has at least one real root lying between c1 and 8. 
Proof. 1. If c1 and 8 have the same sign (either both posi- 
tive or both negative), then it is clear that the terms of the 
functions which are positive or negative for x = c1 retain their 
signs for x = 8 and for all values of x which lie between c1 and 
6. Now suppose the value of the function is positive for x = ct 
but negative for x = 8. This change can only arise because the 
sum of the positive terms in it turns out to be greater than 
that of the negative terms for x = ~1, but smaller than that of 
the negative terms for x = 8. But the sum of the former, as 
well as that of the latter, is of the form 
a + bxm + cxn + a.9 + pxr 
of Section 17, i.e., a continuous function. Let us therefore 
designate the one by ox and the other by fx. Then because 
fa < $a and f!j > $8, by Section 15 there must be some value of 
x lying between c1 and 8 for which fx = $x. But for this value 
fx - 4x, i.e., the given function, is zero; therefore this value 
is a root of the equation 
xn + axn-1 + bxn-2 + l ** + px + q = 0. 
2. But if a and B are opposite in sign, consider the value 
the given function takes for x = 0. If this is zero, then it 
is known that the given equation has a real root lying between 
a and 8, namely, x = 0. But if this value (the quantity q) is 
positive, then it is known that the given function is positive 
for x = 0 but negative for x = 8, and, because the same terms 
which are positive or negative for x = 8 retain these signs for 
all values lying between 0 and 8, one can prove, through the 
same arguments as those in part 1 of the proof, that there must 
be a value of x lying between 0 and 8 which makes the function 
zero. Finally, if q is negative, then what we have just said 
still holds provided 6 is replaced by CL. Now since a value 
lying between 0 and 8 or between 0 and c1 also lies between cx 
and B, if they are opposite in sign, then the truth of our 
theorem is proved for every case. 
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NOTES 
1. The three proofs mentioned here are to be found in their 
Latin versions in Gauss 118661 and in German translation in Netto 
118901. The second proof, "Demonstratio nova altera . ..." of 
1816 has an abridged English translation in Smith [1929]. 
2. "Crossing to another kind." A similar phrase occurs 
in Aristotle's Posterior analytics 75a 39: "One cannot, therefore, 
prove by crossing from another kind--e-q. something geometrical 
by arithmetic,,' IBarnes 1975, 131. 
3. The paragraphs referred to in Bolzano's footnote cover 
about seven pages of the original [Bolzano 18101, but are im- 
portant for understanding what he means by a "justification." 
The following are brief summaries of those paragraphs: 
Section 2. The totality of all true judgments is governed 
by a certain objective connection through which some judgments 
are the grounds of others which are said to be consequences of 
the former. The proper purpose of a scientific exposition is 
to represent this objective connection between judgments, i.e., 
to select a set of judgments and arrange them so as to make 
clear which of them are consequences. Usually the purpose of 
exposition is regarded as providing certainty and conviction 
for difficult propositions (consequently obvious ones need not 
be proved). This is a worthy aim but not compatible with scien- 
tific exposition. The main purpose of scientific investigation 
is to find the ultimate grounds of our judgments. 
Section 10. The basic propositions IGrundsatzel are usually 
taken (in mathematics and logic books) to be those which are 
obvious or intuitive and need no proof. But this is clearly 
unsatisfactory, as these qualities are subjective and a matter 
of degree. The great mathematicians seem to have realized this 
as they gave proofs whenever they could, even for very obvious 
truths. 
Section 20. Judgments which are known a priori to be true 
and which have a compound concept as subject, or as predicate, 
are always provable (from simpler judgments involving the component 
concepts), and so cannot be basic propositions. Hence the un- 
provable or basic propositions must be among those whose subjects 
and predicates are completely simple concepts. Every simple 
concept is the subject of at least one unprovable judgment, for 
otherwise there would be infinite regress. 
Section 21. However, to show that a judgment with simple 
subject and predicate--,,A is B"--is a basic proposition, it is 
necessary to show that there are no two propositions of the 
form "A is X" and "X is B" from which "A is B" could be a con- 
sequence. To do this usually requires a consideration which 
I call a deduction to distinguish it from a proof. These deduc- 
tions are an essential part of a scientific exposition in that 
without them we could never be sure that our basic propositions 
really are such. 
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4. Bolzano always uses inequality signs to apply only to 
the magnitude of quantities and not to their position on a number 
line. This was common practice at the time as there was still 
no standard symbol for modulus. Thus in Bolzano's usage x > -1 
means the range we should now describe as x < -1. For example, 
in Section 2 he states that the general term of a geometric pro- 
gression aer becomes "ever larger when e > 21" and "ever smaller 
when e < fl." And in Section 15.IV he describes the range of 
values of x between a and B when c1 is negative and 8 positive 
as "all values of x which if negative are < cl, and if positive 
are < f3." 
5. Section 14 referred to reads (my translation): "To 
denote a quantity which can become smaller than any given 
quantity, we choose the signs w, R, or a similar one." 
6. A comparable verbal shift occurs in the German from 
"den Zustand des Nullseyns" ("the state of being zero") to "eines 
Zustandes des Nichtvorhandenseyns" ("the state of non-existence" 
in the sense of being lacking or absent). 
7. In this paper Gauss considers in detail the proofs, 
mentioned at the beginning of Bolzano's text, by d'Alembert, 
Euler, de Foncenex, and Lagrange. He also supplies references 
to these proofs. 
8. "an equation of odd degree is certainly soluble." 
9. The theorem referred to reads (my translation): "Theorem. 
If a function of x, Frx, which has arbitrarily many terms but is 
formed according to a definite rule, has the property either 
for all values of x or for all between certain limits a and b, 
that it can be made as small as desired merely by the increase 
in its number of terms r, and if, further, frx denotes a function 
of x which depends on the first in such a way that for any value 
of x between a and b the equation 
F~(x+u) - FrX 
w 
= frX + $l 
holds, where R can be made as small as desired if w can as well; 
then I assert that the function frX also possesses the property 
that for the same values of x as F x r , it can be made as small 
as desired if its set of terms r is taken large enough." 
10. The paper with the title quoted was published later in 
1817 in Leipzig. One of the others referred to must have been 
"Versuch einer Begriindung der Lehre von den drei Dimensionen 
des Raumes, II published in 1845, but according to its preface 
already written in 1815. 
11. The German is "Willkiirliche Satz," literally, "arbitrary 
proposition"--referring to the introduction in this paragraph of 
a notation for series. 
12. Section 22 contains the following theorem and a proof: 
"Theorem. Every product formed from an arbitrary number of proper 
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fractions which are all smaller than a given one, can be made 
smaller than any given quantity by increasing its [number of] 
factors." 
13. Section 8 contains the following theorem and a proof: 
"Theorem. The binomial equation holds for every integral positive 
value of n, whatever x is, provided r is not taken smaller than 
n. " 
The "binomial equation" is defined in Section 3 as 
(l+X)n = 1 + f . X+R.-.x2+il n-l .-.-. n-l n-2 ,3 + . . . 
1 2 12 3 
n-l n-2 
+:-T*- '.' 3 
n-b-1) . xr 
r 
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